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Abstract: In this paper we examine the nature of the competences needed for promoting innovation and 
change.  Taking  our  experiences  as  the  starting  point,  we  examined  the  literature  and  interviewed 
managers and those responsible for innovation in enterprises and discovered that our research findings 
contradict the simplistic view of innovation facilitation and management material in the work place. Our 
research suggests that for innovation to take place two contradictory notions, the order principle and the 
disorder principle, have to be engaged at the same time. As a philosophy, the Positivistic epistemology is 
unable to handle these contradictions. Therefore we suggest the use of Morin’s “dialogy” as a way of 
managing these contradictions essential for innovation. 
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I.  Introduction: skills and competences for innovation and change 
We worked for a long time in innovative environments. We understand by “innovation” the break 
out and implementation of new ideas or principles, in the product/services aspects as well as in 
the technological and organizational aspects. Innovation must be understood as a holistic and 
composite  notion,  which  must  be  preserved  from  a  too  specialised  focus.  To  our  mind, 
innovation  is  significantly  linked  to  change  and  “movement”  issues.  As  far  as  innovation  is 
concerned, change is not a phenomenon under control, rationally regulated using structured 
and recurrent methodologies, but something uncontrolled, unceasing and often anonymous. 
Starting from our experiences and reflections on innovation and change, for several years we 
have evaluated case studies and literature, shared activities with managers and those people 
responsible  for  innovation,  and  observed  and  formally  interviewed  them.  We  have  been 
surprised by tha fact that when managers, responsible people and even researchers express 
themselves on innovation and change, they produce contradictory information, even if they are 
not conscious of such a fact. 
For  instance,  as  far  as  competences  for  innovation  and  change  are  concerned,  we  have 
discovered considerable contradictory opinions in the field as to what competences must be 
developed in order to support innovation and change. The same person is able to declare that 
he prefers one thing but very often he is able to affirm the opposite, even in the same interview. 
For  instance,  autonomy  and  initiative,  motivation  and  involvement  and  the  capacity  for 
understanding issues under their dynamic and positive aspects are often quoted in the literature 
and by practitioners as the basic conditions for innovation and change. But at the same time, 
the  same  persons  are  able  to  tell  us  that  they  would  like  to  have  more  discipline  and 
submissiveness  in  order  to  proceed  in  an  organized  manner  and  synergistically  meet  the 
strategic priorities of the group, the department or the company. 
Positivist epistemology does not easily accommodate such contradictions. It obliges people to 
choose  between  one  term  or  another.  It  does  not  understand  that  such  opposite  terms  are 
opposed because our mental constructs consider them in exclusive terms, it does not take them 
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such dynamic relationships central to our understanding of innovation or positively changing 
environments. Our experience and the analysis of our observations and interviews we have 
performed reveals that managers who have to achieve innovation and to face change, have 
difficulties  in  understanding  and  acting  to  generate  ‘breakthrough’  thinking  and  undertaking 
radical  change  (the  disorder  principle)  whilst  at  the  same  time,  gathering  and  channelling 
energies which is the result of an efficient and tightly managed group (the order principle). In 
order to address such a fundamental epistemological conflict, we introduce the concept of a 
“dialogy”,  taken  from  the  epistemology  of  complexity  by  Morin  (1995)  as  the  basis  for  our 
explanations and proposals. 
 
II.  Complexity and the concept of a “dialogy” 
The concept of “dialogy” (Morin, 1995) proposes the accommodation of “the included third” in 
one’s cognitive processes. This concept is the opposite of the concept of “the excluded third” 
omnipresent  in  occidental  thinking  from  Aristotle’s  philosophy  to  the  modern  philosophy  of 
knowledge which forms the basis of binary thinking. Morin proposes “the included third” in order 
to generate, to give corps and effectively develop “thinking different” cognitive methods by the 
use of an epistemology of complexity. If we admit that, as far as innovation and change are 
concerned, we are effectively dealing with complex issues, which is obviously the case when 
managing  innovation  and  change  processes.  We  have  to  “invent”  and/or  share  complex 
epistemological concepts and to find a way for people (those responsible, but certainly also 
anyone in the company and in the society) to appropriate and master such new cognitive habits. 
The main argument for such a posture is that when we define contraries and contradictions in 
our current ways of conceptualizing, it is probably not because such things are “ontologically” 
opposite,  or  opposed  by  nature,  but  because  they  appear  opposed  as  a  result  of  our 
conceptualizing cognitive processes. It is our culture, and particularly our language which is the 
main raw material we use to produce cognitive constructions of the word (our understanding of 
the word). We do not describe the word; we only produce cognitive representations of it. In this 
respect, we need to build such representations of the world (past, present or future…), and to 
build speech in order to exchange and discuss with others (necessary for any exchange, for any 
cooperation  and  for  any  collective  performance). We  need  these  building  bricks  in  order  to 
engage in such activities. Words are our blocks. Of course, being the main material for social 
exchanges and cultural development, emerging over years and centuries, words and the way 
we use them in society are culturally shaped. In our rationalistic societies, we have a tendency 
to  consider  that  each  block  (each  word)  is  a  piece  of  cognitive  material.  The  culturally 
determined conscience  we have  of the cognitive status of these blocks (words) is that they 
represent the boundaries of pieces of “reality” one is dealing with. In the mental representations 
one generates in relation to innovation and change questions, as well as in other matters, it is 
difficult  for  people  to  understand  that  the  same  referent  may  be  conceptualized  using  two 
mental  categories  that  we  may  consider  opposite  in  a  cultural  sense  i.e.  ying  and  yang  in 
Chinese philosophy. 
Cognitive habits that are linked to action are finally “grounded” in the “action-linked” side of our 
epistemology. That is to say, at the end of the day, that they represent the most important side 
of  things,  because  they  are  the  instances  where  ideas  and  discourses  are  confronted  with 
action. Using words is necessary in order to represent the world (and to speak of it), but at the 
same time, traditional binary thinking is unable to generate sufficient intelligibility for complex 
issues, particularly in the management fields, as far as innovation and change are concerned. 
That is the fundamental reason why we have noticed that managers and people responsible 
generate “contradictory” speeches when they deal with innovation and change. We concluded 
that words and binary thinking are at the same time a necessary ingredient and the main limits 
to our intelligibility. Continuing in such an epistemology means remaining in a limited sphere of 
understanding.  It  is  impossible  to  go  beyond  the  end  of  understanding.  People  have  to  go 
further than the limits that the classical use of words de facto imposes on our mindsets. That is 






































As stressed above, our thinking processes are heavily conditioned by positivist assumptions (no 
contradictions, single truth, objectivity…) and by our language (Foucault, 1962) when we use 
words, we give “labels” to things. It is of course absolutely necessary, because if we do not use 
words, we will not be able to either conceptualize or exchange with others. What we are not 
aware of is that we do these with unconscious assumptions that words correspond to things and 
describe things, each word or expression defining a boundary and a “substance” encapsulated 
within the boundary. The consequence of such a posture is that we unconsciously assume that 
a  thing  must  be  inside  or  outside  the  boundary.  This  last  rule  is  known  in  the  Aristotle’s 
epistemology  -  the  “rule  of  the  excluded  third”.  We  have  to  think  differently,  introducing 
opposites and contradictions (in the classical epistemology) as relevant as a complement to the 
binary  approach  and  seeking  relationships  and  dynamics  between  these  opposites,  these 
dynamic co-productions being the “included third”. In this paper, we want to focus on the fact 
that such an approach represents a rich cognitive attitude facing innovation and change. 
Morin’s (1995) work is obviously strongly linked to constructivist epistemologies. That is to say 
that such epistemologies basically assume that knowledge must be considered as the fruit of 
one’s mental construct (representations) and not as “photographs” or mere descriptions of any 
existing  ontological  reality  (more  evidently  if  we  deal  with  immaterial  and  tacit  or  implicit 
referents  like  change  and  innovation).  The  second  important  idea  that  we  can  extract  from 
recent  works  in  such  epistemologies  is  that  the  way  we  proceed  to  generate  such  mental 
representations is obviously influenced by two kinds of considerations. Concrete conditions in 
which cognitive processes are embedded are of a great importance to the understanding of 
knowledge  generation.  The  second  is  the  kind  of  social  networks  in  which  the  considered 
individual is immersed at the time he is having this cognitive activity, the level and kinds of 
activities  these  networks  produce  during  the  considered  period,  the  technology  which  is 
available, the concrete material conditions, etc. 
On the other hand, it is also evident that “long term” cognitive considerations have also to be 
considered. By “long term considerations”, we mean the memorized elements of knowledge, 
taking into account their affective coloration and cultural and identity factors as well. Such “long 
term” factors are obviously involved in the formation of mental representations, as far as they 
condition  (at  least  partially)  the  mental  and  affective  mindset-frameworks  in  which  mental 
representations emerge. We would like to underline that if such “long term” factors condition the 
“short term” cognitive activity of actors, particularly the formation of mental representations, it is 
also true that this short term activity, in turn, impacts on long term cognitive activities, as far as 
they  will  produce  new  memory  activity  and  will  influence  the  evolution  of  affects,  attitudes, 
values and convictions. 
This  reflection  suggests  that  we  must  critically  challenge  (deconstruct,  if  we  use  the  Gilles 
Deleuze’s vocabulary) the mental representations, ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and more generally 
the cognitive processes we produce, at least as far as we are self-conscious of them
1. One of 
the  conceptual  tools  for  doing  so  is  “dialogy”.  As  far  as  meta-cognitive  competencies
2  are 
concerned, we certainly need to consider competences of one type as well as competences of 
the opposite type. We have not only to admit contraries, but also, if we think that cognition, as it 
is conditioned by classical binary epistemology (essentially consisting of separation i.e. creating 
categories using the “rule of the excluded third”), then we must also take cognizance of the fact 
that such boundaries are arbitrary and cognitively determined. We need to promote the idea that 
a term may not be thought without its opposite, and further that opposite terms produce each 
other, or at least influence each other. Therefore, we must imagine (cognitively built) what may 
happen  in  the  trans-boundary  or  inter-boundary  space  (between  categories  and  between 
opposites): that is to say how opposites build and condition each other. In doing so, we build 
richer  representations  and  we  prefer  the  ability  for  listening  and  understanding  others. 
Therefore, we will be more ready to understand and integrate opposite opinions. 
                                                       
1 This reflection opens the door to the development of one type of competences which is rarely 
considered i.e. the cognitive competences, and particularly one of them, related to learning, 
reflexivity and self-conscience. 
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An important characteristic of this epistemological posture is that the structuring categories that 
we usually propose for a given issue (for instance the issue of behavioural competencies for 
innovation  and change) must be understood as  a proposal for more intelligibility, not as  an 
ontological  truth. This is  more akin to Checkland’s  (1999) use of the concept of a “notional 
system” i.e. such systems exist only as a notion for bringing about changes and restructuring 
thinking processes. Consequences of such a posture to management is that it offers a more 
complete and dynamic appreciation of complex issues, that is to say a lot of questions to be 
taken into account but not necessarily a ready solution in terms of organization (structure) and 
actions  to  be  undertaken.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  it  is  a  cognitive  construct 
(representations) which is neither impartial nor objective, but a mere “product” based on our 
culture, opinions and beliefs and also on our intentions and our ways of working and thinking 
during the process. 
As far as “answers” are concerned, the issue of what kind of “question” to be asked is obviously 
a central one. For instance, if one considers the question of meta-cognitive competencies from 
the point of view of which one must be improved, developed and acquired (learnt) for innovation 
and change (the case in this reflection), one will need to build an “answer” to this question, not 
to another one! Obviously, as the question is addressed, the incident reflection, individual and / 
or collective, will be coloured, starting from the question that has been raised. The answer will 
certainly be made up from a list of competencies (abilities to…). We noticed in the beginning of 
this research work that answers to such a question would include competencies that would be 
considered as opposite (following classical epistemology) and that we would try to understand 
how these opposites may influence each other or impact on each other. 
Nonetheless, in our example, in the question we have done, the problem of such competencies’ 
holders is not addressed. In thinking about and focussing on this question, we focus only on one 
question. For instance, we do not ask the following question: must the same person possess 
one  competence  and  its  opposite  and  be  the  “motor”  of  their  interactions?  Must  opposing 
competences be held by different persons? Is the answer to this question contextual, that is to 
say specific to each issue, to each team, to each specific situation? Of course, one more time, 
there is no easy answer to such a question. In fact, the question of what kind of management, 
organization, methods and tools must be examined is as an equally complex issue. We are 
definitely out of the “one best way” Taylorian approach. The time of prevision, planning, task 
definition, training “right men in right places”, structured evaluation and control is over. To our 
mind, all these issues must be considered assuming the epistemological assumptions we have 
defined above and considering aspects of the cognitive processes we have suggested. That is 
why the job of a manager is becoming that hard! The question today is to understand how one 
may  enter  in  the  play  with  intelligence.  The  incessancy  and  omnipresence  of  movement, 
innovation and change are converting these actions in a succession of complex and difficult, but 
also exciting challenges.  
 
III.  A dialogic glance on cognitive competencies 
We have made a number of interventions related to innovation and change in “small social 
groups” (small companies, departments, groups, project-teams, etc). Such an experience shows 
that  the  improvement  of  behavioural  and  meta-cognitive  competences  constitutes  a  key 
ingredient for behaving effectively in moving and innovative environments. The problem is that 
behavioural  and  meta-cognitive  competences  are  very  fuzzily  defined  (Calvez  and  Nekka, 
2006). Innovation cannot offer its full potential, or may even be impossible to achieve without 
the acceptance of positive mindsets and attitudes of people. We must deepen such a key issue, 
particularly  starting  from  some  significant  examples,  some  specific  kinds  of  meta-cognitive 
competences. This approach will be made using dialogic mode as its epistemological base. 
What are “meta-cognitive competencies”? 
As underlined above, in today’s environments, it is obvious that behavioural competencies are 
of key importance. Literature is congruent on this point, arguing that new organizational forms, 






































and creativity require new kinds of behaviour based on responsibility and involvement. We are 
completely in agreement with this posture. Nevertheless, the point we want to highlight in this 
contribution  is  that  beside  “classical”  behavioural  competencies  we  have  to  take  into 
consideration another kind of competency that we name as “meta-cognitive competences”. As 
explained above, we think that new global and dynamic environments change dramatically the 
groundwork on which the question of innovation and change are being considered. Challenges 
are becoming unceasing and much deeper, faster and harder. We are not really aware of the 
depth to what is happening, as classical cognitive assumptions and solutions do not seem to 
apply  anymore.  Therefore,  as  managers  or  even  simple  workers,  we  do  not  know  how  to 
behave, nor what may be the relevant solutions. Complexity is often the word which expresses 
these difficulties. The word is accurate, of course! But it requires taking time to “think about 
thinking”, trying to understand what we could do in order to “think differently” (that is why we 
propose  the  expression  of  “meta-cognitive”  competencies:  What  must  be  changed  in  our 
cognitive processes in order to understand better what is happening in the world, or at least in 
the world of organizations?? And then, what could we change in our behaviours? 
As far as complexity is concerned, a fundamental epistemological question is about stating the 
following  issue.  Obviously,  there  is  no  problem  for  assuming  complexity  as  an  ontological 
characteristic of any concerned organizational question. But the problem is that if we assume 
this  complexity,  we  must  also  assume  that  any  analysis  produced  on  such  a  referent  is 
necessarily partial (not complete and not impartial). Complexity means we have no access to 
truth in the positivist and rationalist sense. We have to admit this change in considering the 
purpose of science. Our scientific activity is not impartial. It may be rigorous, which means that 
we must try to investigate, identify and control the dangers and limits of our posture, but not 
objective.  The  quest  for  objectivity  is  certainly  coming  from  afar,  but  is  definitely  not  a 
characteristic of knowledge, particularly in affairs where people are thinking about themselves 
and their conditions and where “political” aspects are relevant. 
Cognitive  processes,  which  “produce”  the  knowledge,  are  strongly  conditioned  by  cognitive 
routines  and  they  are,  consciously  or  otherwise,  coloured  by  one’s  convictions,  values  and 
culture and at the same time, by the concrete and material conditions of the considered situation 
itself and of one’s integration with it. By the way, emotions and affects, emotional intelligence, 
are equally central to this activity. What motivates us to be interested in a question? How will we 
choose the way of structuring the project or designing the research? What are our intentions? 
What is the nature of the political environment that will define the “politically correct” acceptable 
statements? Who are the “clients” of such an activity? All this will decide, or at least condition 
the questions we will be interested in, the ways of reasoning and investigating we will engage 
in, the explanations we will produce, the facts we will highlight, the modes of understanding 
things  and  their  dynamics,  etc.  This  is  true  for  everybody:  researchers  definitely,  but  also 
managers and simple workers. 
For instance, a particular observation we can make in innovation and change issues in western 
countries is that good practice, successes and positive results often seem to be considered as 
exceptions  or  unusual  facts:  they  must  be  identified,  formalized,  diffused,  and  shared  as  if 
unconsciously,  the  normal  state  of  things  was  necessarily  bad  and  negatively  charged. 
Therefore an interesting challenge, as far as change and innovation are considered, should be 
to  make  these  desirable  aspects  to  be  considered  normal  or  positively  charged.  Obviously, 
“negative  charge”  feelings  also  are  a  cognitive  issue.  Following  the  theory  of  conventions 
(Reynaud, 1989), if people develop negative or depressed feelings about their environment, 
then their representations and conceptualizations are negatively charged (highlighting failures, 
routine, lack of interest, etc.). Because mental representations are negatively charged, people 
carry  on  developing  negative  feelings  and  go  on  producing  negatively  charged  mental 
representations. It is like an “autopïetic system” that Hämäläinen and Saarinen (2006) call a 
“mutual holding back system” in which the fact of considering every day’s actions and issues 
negatively produces negative thoughts. This means that local actions lead to active relations 
with each others and therefore must be one of the entry points to the issue in order to break this 
negatively oriented circle.  
All these competencies relate to the ability to positively conceptualize problems, situations and 
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and as suggested in the theory of reflective learning through “cognitive redefinition”, (Schein, 
2002) or applications of “enaction” theory by Varela and Maturana (1980), We believe that this 
kind of learning can only be done in the context of concrete actions. That is to say that limited 
actions  and  positive  achievements  involving  the  concerned  actors  must  be  realized  and 
capitalized (in a kind of loop) by concerned actors. Then processes of transfer and diffusion may 
be set up, but they cannot be any kind of “cut and paste”. They always must be realized, built 
and capitalized with concerned actors themselves. 
Such considerations are directly linked to the mental processes people use in their cognitive 
activities. As such, competences have to do with the cognitive control that people may exercise 
on their own cognitive activities (“thinking different”), even if it is necessary to understand the 
question  along  a  “socio-cognitive”  dimension.  Of  course  the  individual  “in-brain”  activity  is 
central, that is why we propose to name such competences as “meta-cognitive competences”. 
Nonetheless, as far as such cognitive evolutions are concerned, it is obvious that the role of the 
environment, contacts and interchanges with others and the animation of the considered group 
are also very important, being considered in their tight interaction with the mentioned “in-brain” 
activities. Both must be considered as working together in a tight knitting interaction (it is a kind 
of dialogic posture we apply to our own reflection). 
Applying a dialogic approach to “meta-cognitive competencies” 
The  main  conclusion  we  are  able  to  deduce  from  our  reflections  is  that  the  issues  we  are 
dealing with, that is to say how to develop innovation and change and how to involve people in 
such positive perspectives, require promoting complex thinking. As the challenge is to change 
our cognitive processes in order to better understand the fundamental challenges of dynamic 
complexity  and to build how to behave in face of it, complex thinking is obviously made of 
several aspects, of several interrelated dimensions, many of them remaining to be discovered. 
As we have stated above, we will present an example, among several possible dimensions: the 
dialogical principle. 
We will start from the idea that the encouragement of local initiatives and actions, in all the kinds 
of activities of the company, not only on products and technology, must be developed. Initiative 
and  positively  oriented  mindsets  are  obviously  necessary  in  the  face  of  immobility, 
submissiveness  and  negative  mindsets,  developed,  or  at  least  maintained  by  traditional 
organizational modes. As long as structures and activities are organised in a top-down way, as 
long as the organizational modes and the power system in the company consider execution is 
limited to the operational levels and reflection, design and control are the preserve of the higher 
levels of organizational pyramid, then the development, involvement, feelings of belongings and 
optimistic  behaviour  may  be  difficult  to  achieve.  One  cannot  act  and  behave  as  if  such 
characteristics were not present in considered environments and if there is no necessity to fight 
against them. On the other hand, it is also important to consider that the values and modes of 
organization  that  are  at  work  in  taylorist  environments  also  have  some  virtues,  which  allow 
channelling  of  energies  in  ordered  ways  of  developing  things,  which  are  certainly  important 
characteristics in order to avoid complete anarchy. Considering these two arguments, people 
are able to explain that they are against and pro one form of organization or the other! That is 
why we need the “dialogical principle” in our cognitive toolbox for developing complex thinking. 
Some organizations are currently considered as “ideal types” of Taylorian organizations. They 
generally show a strong top down hierarchical organizational chart, develop precise definitions 
of tasks and effective planning systems. However, any Social-psychologist knows that such an 
organization is only able to work (in a more or less efficient way) because the effective modes of 
work and communication do not conform to the letter and the spirit of Taylorian principles. It 
may  be  because  the  hierarchy  itself  understands  that  transversal  modes  of  work, 
communication and cooperation (like processes and projects) are needful in order to undertake 
the dangers of “self-locking” that a Taylorian organization represents in face of the extreme 
dynamic  variety  of  environments  (in  a  systemic  meaning).  It  may  be  also  because  workers 
invent “subversive” ways of working, communication and cooperation that permit them to work 
and  produce  their  output.  Or  it  may  be  a  natural  combination  of  both.  Nevertheless,  some 
scientists  think  that  the  fundamental  nature  of  Taylorism  remains  to  some  extent  in  such 






































they consider such phenomenon, underlying that such organizations remain Taylorist as their 
fundamental  dominant  paradigm.  That  is  also  why  such  organizational  modes  may  be 
considered  as  producers  of  “mutual  holding-back  systems”  and,  following  the  theory  of 
conventions, are in turn reinforced by it. Nonetheless, we think that such evolutions are opening 
different ways of working at the same time, as a kind of struggle between the old model and 
new flatter forms of organizations based on empowerment, initiative, cooperation and a certain 
degree of disorder! 
In  fact,  local  initiatives  (i.e.  disequilibrium  and  disorder,  in  relation  with  Taylorist  order)  are 
desirable  for  innovation  and  change.  But  the  ambient  culture  is  generally  against  such 
initiatives. It is an aspect of the struggle we mentioned above. It is impossible, and possibly 
dangerous, for a manager to understand situations and to behave as if the current organization, 
ambient negativity and its related behaviours were not at work. In fact, this negativity is made of 
several ingredients i.e. positive valuation of order and equilibrium, reluctance to change, fear for 
the future (uncertainty), submissiveness, reluctance to take on responsibilities, etc. But, at the 
same time, it is also dangerous to act as if degrees of freedom did not exist in any kind of 
organization and as if the necessity for innovation and change could be ignored. To our mind, 
our  ways  of  thinking  must  use  epistemological  modes  of  reasoning,  issues  have  to  be 
approached in a dialogical way; the issues we are dealing with must be considered by applying 
both  opposite  perspectives,  considering  them  as  acting  in  conflict  as  well  as  in  mutual  co-
production relationships. The person may be responsible for innovation or may even be a single 
worker  empowered  to  take  initiatives.  Conceptualizing  ideas  without  using  dialogical  mode 
(considering interacting opposites) may generate only a poorer understanding of the situation. 
The fundamental characteristics of dynamics, positivity and self confidence they are supposed 
to favour in the mental representations of people will necessarily be frustrated. 
IV. Conclusion 
The role of the leader or manager is critical for the developments of dialogical “meta-cognitive 
competencies”. As far as dialogy is concerned, leaders and managers must be aware of the 
dual manner of considering ideas when they start on the management of the transformation 
processes they manage. They have to encourage local initiatives and minor improvements and 
to organize capitalization and learning modes on them in order to make their teams move in a 
positive way, and to generate positive mental representations in their minds. At the same time, 
they must also manage this in tune, or even in conflict, with the aspects of organizational order. 
It is necessary in order to stay on the edge of chaos but not lead to anarchy. Synchronising 
order with disorder and understanding how they are mutually producing and conditioning each 
other constitute an important part of their art of management. It is obviously a question of on-
going personal learning. The other responsibility they have is to help people for whom they are 
responsible to learn from such “meta-cognitive competencies” in their day to day activity. 
There is no generic or recurrent method for facilitating and managing innovative activities. In this 
paper we examined current research and concluded that they are inconsistent with our own 
research. Complex thinking must be promoted to engage and understand complex movements. 
Focussing on a particular angle of complex thinking, our research suggests that we need to 
address  two  opposing  and  contradictory  principles  at  the  same  time,  considering  the 
interrelationships that link them together and that make them susceptible to be conceptualized. 
Since Positivistic epistemology cannot address these contradictions, we proposed the use of 
Morin’s “dialogy” concept as a “cognitive discipline” helpful for addressing the challenge. For 
instance  the  principles  we  have  chosen  in  this  paper  are  the  order  and  disorder  principles. 
Instead of current cognitive disjunction (let us consider as an example the following statement: a 
situation characterized by order [submissiveness] requires a cure of disorder [initiative]), we will 
try  to  conceptualize  ideas  in  oppositions  and  in  their  interactions.  Order  cannot  be 
conceptualized without the concept of disorder. The inverse relation is true as well. And it is 





































0Short title of the paper 
ERIMA07’ Proceedings 
V.  References 
Checkland P B (1999), Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Wiley and Sons 
Foucault, M. (1966), Les mots et les choses, Seuil. 
Hämäläinen  and  Saarinen  (2006):  Systems  intelligence:  a  key  competence  for 
organizational life, reflections-solonline.org. 
Morin, E. (1995), Introduction à la pensée complexe, Flammarion 
Reynaud, J. D. (1989): Les règles du jeu, l’action collective et la régulation sociale, A. 
Colin. 
Schein  E.H.  (2002),  Models  and  tools  for  stability  and  change  in  human  systems, 
Reflections, vol. 4, n° 2, pp. 34 – 46.  
Varela and Maturana (1980), Autopoïesis and cognition: the realization of the living, 
Riedel 
Vincent, C., Nekka,  H., (2006),  « Le management des savoirs et la valorisation des 
comportements  professionnels :  le  rôle  du  dirigeant  dans  la  création  d’un  avantage 
concurrentiel », XVème Conférence AIMS, Genève, 13-16 juin 2006. 
 
h
a
l
-
0
0
4
4
5
5
1
9
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
8
 
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
0